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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BROWN AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY: A COMMENT ON WILLIAM NELSON

MARY L. DUDZIAK*
One characteristic of the scholarship on Brown1—wonderful and rich as it
is—is that the scholarship often isolates Brown and civil rights history from
other aspects of American and world history.2 If we isolate Brown from the
rest of history, it not only narrows our understanding of those other
historiographic questions, it also leaves us unable to fully understand Brown
itself. One of the important contributions of William Nelson’s very rich and
provocative article is that he sets Brown in a broader context, asking the sort of
questions that we can only ask by stepping back from the intricacies of Brown.
Nelson’s focus is on the role of Brown in the history of American legal
thought. At the heart of Nelson’s story is a vision of history. Nelson equates
history with progress. “[M]ost people who look back on the Twentieth
Century,” he suggests, “tend to think of the Twentieth Century as a time of
progress.”3 Because, in this vision, history inevitably moves us toward a better
world, if law follows along behind society, then law is inevitably
“progressive.” In invoking the idea of progress, Nelson taps into a central
American narrative. For example, as David Brion Davis has demonstrated, the
idea of progress has framed debates about race in American history. Slavery
was a form of progress, its proponents argued, and later, abolitionists argued
that emancipation would aid human progress.4 Ideas of progress have
informed political movements, from early Twentieth Century “Progressives,”5
to contemporary, more loosely defined “progressives.”
* Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Professor of Law and History, University of Southern
California Law School.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. For criticisms of this tendency, see, for example, BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER, RISING
WIND: BLACK AMERICANS AND U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1935–1960 (1996) (arguing that
African-American history and United States diplomatic history should not be isolated from each
other); Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, J. AMER. HIST. (forthcoming 2004)
(arguing that Brown’s Cold War context is an important part of its history).
3. William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal
Realism, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 795, 832 (2004).
4. See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS (1984).
5. On the Progressive Movement, see MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003).
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For Nelson, “progress” is not a perspective brought to history. Instead, it
is an element of history. In his view, society progresses toward a more just
future. Law, however, is not inevitably progressive. Nelson’s central concern
is with the relationship between law and society.6 He argues that, during the
first half of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court hewed to a vision of
law and society that is characteristic of Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s
jurisprudence.7 Law and legal thought did not direct society in a particular
direction. Rather, the Court worked with the idea of law as following along
behind society.8 Using the metaphor of a train, Nelson sees society as the
train, and law as the caboose following behind.9 The proper role of judges in
this conceptualization was to keep the caboose lined up; they could keep law
from derailing the societal train.10
Nelson argues that Brown upset this law/society relationship. After
Brown, courts came to embrace an idea of judging that Nelson identifies with
Ronald Dworkin.11 Under this approach, law does not follow behind society,
but leads the way. Law is an engine, taking society in whatever direction the
Dworkinian (or Rhenquistian) engineer wishes to go.12 Because, for Nelson,
society moves in a progressive direction, law remains progressive when
fastened carefully behind society. This is why Nelson sees a departure from
Cardozo’s law-as-a-caboose position as a move away from a more predictably
progressive legal method. When law is uncoupled from society’s directive
force, law is open to an array of progressive and anti-progressive impulses.
Law has then lost its inevitably progressive character.13 The particular irony in
this story, of course, is that it is a progressive ruling—Brown—that set the
stage for this unraveling.
The optimism in Nelson’s vision of history is appealing. However, any
chance of sustaining that vision surely disintegrated into dust along with the

6. The question of the relationship between law and society has been an important question
in legal historiography. For a discussion, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
7. Nelson, supra note 3, at 804.
8. See id. at 799.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 799-800, 803.
12. No matter how creative the engineer, a train must follow pre-set tracks, so perhaps the
better metaphor here would be law as a Humvee, a.k.a. “Hummer,” barreling across the terrain,
unfettered by roadways or sign posts, wreaking environmental damage along the way. See
MICHAEL GREEN, HUMMER: THE NEXT GENERATION (1995); The Hummer Network, at
www.humvee.net (last visited Dec. 30, 2003); The Hummerdinger, at www.sierraclubmedia.net
(last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
13. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 799.
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World Trade Center towers as a new century uncomfortably began.14 In the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, we are forced to confront the reality that all
that is inevitable about history is that we are forever catapulted forward
through time. Whether we can perceive history as progressive or not depends
on which arbitrary moment on the timeline we look backwards from. And it
depends on which pair of eyes we view history through.
We can see this at work in the Twentieth Century and in American
jurisprudence and politics at the time of Brown. Nelson’s necessarily brief
history of Twentieth Century jurisprudence is like an express train. We will
see the scenery better, however, if we take the local train, making stops in the
Cold War years. What we see on the slow train is not a progressive vision of
law, and not an inevitably progressive vision of history.15
I suggest that we make a stop in 1951. That year, the Court decided
Dennis v. United States, upholding the conviction of Communist Party
members for such crimes as reading Marx and Engels and talking about
them.16 As Nelson describes it, the case followed the Cardozo vision. The
Court modified its developing First Amendment jurisprudence to expand
government power in the face of a perceived threat, thereby keeping the train
firmly on the tracks directed by society through the McCarthy era. Here,
Justice Felix Frankfurter plays a particularly interesting role. There was no
clear evidence of harm in the Dennis case. To keep the train on the tracks, the
Court could look outside the record, he argued. The Court could simply take
“judicial notice” of the dangers of communism that justified the Court’s
ruling.17 Frankfurter did cite to authority; it was to a New York Times
Magazine essay by George Kennan, the architect of containment.18
Kennan provided more than just evidence of the dangers of communism to
support the Court’s judgment. Kennan provided a window through which
members of the Court, President Truman, and American policymakers could
14. See generally RICHARD BERNSTEIN ET AL., OUT OF THE BLUE: THE STORY OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, FROM JIHAD TO GROUND ZERO (2002); STEPHEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW
AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA (2003); SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A
WATERSHED MOMENT? (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY];
The September 11 Digital Archive, at http://911digitalarchive.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
15. The legal history of the 1940s and 1950s is well-documented. See, e.g., EDWARD
SAMUEL CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1970); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918–1969 (1972).
16. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). On the Dennis case, see MICHAL R.
BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977).
17. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 554. Frankfurter quoted from George F. Kennan, Where Do You Stand on
Communism?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 27, 1951, at 7. On Kennan, see WILSON D.
MISCAMBLE, GEORGE F. KENNAN AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1947–
1950 (1992).
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view their world. A window both opens a line of vision and also structures it.
The court was in the caboose, after all, not at the front of the train, and
Frankfurter was sitting on one side. Looking through the window of Cold War
fears, he saw in the American Communist Party a dangerous fifth column that
threatened the American way of life.19 On the other side, the dissenters were
Justices Douglas and Black, who looked through a different window. In
Douglas’s dissent, he saw a different image of the American Communist Party.
The Party was not a threat, he argued. Instead, “they are miserable merchants
of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold. The fact that their ideas are
abhorrent does not make them powerful.”20 The threat he saw was not to
national security but to liberty and freedom of speech.21
From this episode we can see that keeping law on track in the direction
society is going requires an act of interpretation. The Court has to “read” what
societal needs are. And their perception of society is necessarily structured by
the available ideas of their age. They can only view the world through the
windows available to them. There is no perfect measure of societal needs
available to courts. There are only historically contingent patterns of
perception.
There is another lesson to be learned from this stop at the Cold War
station, and it relates to Nelson’s central idea of history as progress. Nelson
says that most people would think of the Twentieth Century as a period of
progress. Most people would also think that the McCarthy era was not a
heyday for individual rights.22 When we step back from the vision of
inevitable progress, and instead view historical moments and the Court’s own
jurisprudence, as historically contingent, it helps us to focus on an important
and interesting paradox about Brown. The 1950s were not the apex of
individual rights; they were a time of repression. How does Brown fit into that
historical context? How did something so good happen during such a bleak
era? How could the Court be so repressive of individual rights, and so
expansive at the same time? Is Brown somehow an anomaly, standing outside
of the jurisprudence of the McCarthy era, or can the case be understood as a
product of its time? How do we understand Brown’s historical contingency?

19. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 547. On Cold War fears and American culture, see STEPHEN J.
WHITFIELD, THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR (2d ed. 1996) and H.W. BRANDS, THE DEVIL WE
KNEW: AMERICANS AND THE COLD WAR (1993).
20. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 589 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 590.
22. On the McCarthy Era, see, for example, MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL
JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1978);
DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND
EISENHOWER (1978); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (Hill & Wang 2003) (1980); ELLEN
SHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
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We do not have to look very hard to find connections between Brown and
the Cold War. In fact, the connections between Brown and the Cold War are
so ubiquitous in the primary sources that it would be more difficult to explain
them away as irrelevant than to find a place for them in the historical narrative.
In the American press, for example, Brown was called a “[b]low to
Communism.”23 The Pittsburgh Courier said that Brown would “stun and
silence America’s Communist traducers behind the Iron Curtain. It will
effectively impress upon millions of colored people in Asia and Africa the fact
that idealism and social morality can and do prevail in the United States,
regardless of race, creed or color.”24 Sharing this concern, the San Francisco
Chronicle suggested that the ruling’s greatest impact was not on the American
South, but on South America, Africa and Asia, because it would restore their
faith in the justice of American government.25
Brown was a major international story. The decision was on the front-page
in all daily newspapers in India. Under the headline “A Great Decision,” the
Hindustan Times suggested that “American democracy stands to gain in
strength and prestige from the unanimous ruling . . . . The practice of racial
segregation in schools . . . has been a long-standing blot on American life and
civilization.”26 News coverage like this blanketed the world press.27
The U.S. State Department thought that it needed Brown in order to
safeguard the position of the United States in the Cold War. Race in America
was a subject of broad international interest and concern. During the Cold
War, the United States argued that the world was divided between the forces of
good, led by the U.S., and the forces of evil, led by the Soviet bloc. American
democracy was held up as the model, and as superior to the Soviet system
where individual rights were repressed.28 Many around the world wondered
how the United States could hold itself up as a model, and how the United
States could lead the free world through the Cold War, when American school
children were segregated by race.29 Around the world, racism was thought to
be America’s Achilles heel.30 The Soviet Union effectively exploited this
weakness in anti-American propaganda.31

23. The Nation’s Press on Segregation Ruling, N.Y TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 19 (reprinting
several American newspapers’ responses to the Brown ruling).
24. Id.
25. Equal Rights are for All, S.F. CHRON., May 18, 1954, at 18.
26. A Great Decision, HINDUSTAN TIMES, May 20, 1954, at 1.
27. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 108-09 (2000).
28. See id. at 3-4.
29. See id. at 12, 100.
30. See id. at 4-6.
31. Id. at 12; see also id. at 48-49.
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Relying on State Department data, the Justice Department brought this
problem to the Court in its amicus brief in Brown.32 The Justice Department
brief argued that “[t]he existence of discrimination against minority groups in
the United States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries.
Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and
it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion
to the democratic faith.”33 Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded, in a
quote in the brief, that race discrimination “jeopardizes the effective
maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations of the
world.”34 The brief argued that a Supreme Court ruling upholding segregation
would be uniquely harmful to U.S. foreign relations.35 The Secretary of State’s
argument about the harm of segregation to U.S. foreign relations was not
speculative. U.S. State Department files from this period are full of reports
from the field about the way racial problems in the U.S. harmed U.S. relations
with particular nations and complicated U.S. Cold War objectives.36 This
brings Brown and the cases about McCarthyism together. Both were seen as
protections against the dangers of Communism.
Professor Nelson draws upon this history to illustrate the ways Brown was
in keeping with broader societal needs. This move in the paper is important,
and is a departure from most legal scholarship on Brown that isolates the case
from its Cold War context. Here, and in his discussion of the affirmative
action case Grutter v. Bollinger,37 Nelson sets American jurisprudence in a
global context—something the Court itself was doing at the time of Brown,38
but a perspective usually absent from Twentieth Century constitutional history.
This is not a new move for Nelson, for he also sets American legal ideas in a
global context, relating the legal history of New York to the history of the

32. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2-8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (Nos. 8 et al.); see DUDZIAK, supra note 27, at 80-81. See generally Mary L.
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 8 et al.).
34. Id. at 8.
35. See id. at 4-8.
36. Thousands of records on this topic can be found in the State Department files, Decimal
File number 811.411, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. See
generally THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN RACE
RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA (2001); DUDZIAK, supra note 27.
37. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). See Nelson, supra note 3, at 833-834.
38. Chief Justice Earl Warren traveled widely, promoting comparative constitutional law.
Records on this can be found in Warren’s travel files at the Library of Congress. See Papers of
Earl Warren, Foreign File, Personal File, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. Cf. Mary L. Dudziak, The Supreme Court’s History of Indifference to the Opinions of Other
Countries’ Courts, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, at http://hnn.us/articles/1693.html (Sept. 22, 2003).
Other members of the Court regularly traveled overseas as well. See, e.g., WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE (1951).
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United Nations in his important book: The Legalist Reformation.39 This is, I
think, exactly the sort of direction American legal history should be taking.
But, in exploring the relationship between law and society in a global context,
we are brought right back to the problem of how we “read” our surroundings.
David Campbell, in Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the
Politics of Identity, argues that we construct who we are as a nation in response
to an “other” against whom we define ourselves.40 During the Cold War, for
example, the U.S. defined itself in relation to its opponent, the Soviet Union.
Problems of war and aggression are of course “real” in the world, but we place
these threats in a narrative. We interpret them; we give them meaning.
Perhaps we can see this in our own context: September 11, we are told, was not
a horrendous crime, but was part of a “new kind of war.”41 Identifying it as an
act of war was a narrative move. It was an act of interpretation with profound
and continuing consequences. In response to threats, we construct narratives
of national identity and national imperatives. These become the “societal
needs” to which courts and other conform their actions.
In conclusion, my reaction to Professor Nelson’s rich and important paper
is to celebrate its incorporation of a global vision, while stressing historical
contingency rather than inevitable progress, and the inescapable problem of
how we interpret our world. Attending to these issues does not drive us away
from a progressive jurisprudence, casting the court open to conservative
ideology. Instead, I would argue that faith in the inevitability of progress can
generate complacency. Understanding the contingency—and the importance
of perspective—in the act of judging keeps us vigilant about one of the most
contingent of judicial variables. In Brown, in Grutter, in Bush v. Gore,42 it
matters not only what one is able to see out the window—how one’s vision is
historically contingent—but which judges happen to be on the train.

39. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN
NEW YORK, 1920–1980 (2001).
40. DAVID CAMPBELL, WRITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
POLITICS OF IDENTITY passim (1992).
41. See Elaine Tyler May, Echoes of the Cold War: The Aftermath of September 11 at Home,
in SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY, supra note 14, at 35-54.
42. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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